* Posts by dvvdvv

48 posts • joined 22 Dec 2017

Amazon Alexa: 'Pre-wakeword' patent application suggests plans to process more of your speech

dvvdvv

Meanwhile in Deutschland

"Alexa, hier spricht der BND, bitte schicke mir alle Gespräche über das geplante Bombenattentat" - so einfach wird der Zugriff auf private Daten des Sprachassistenten aus dem Hause Amazon zwar nicht. Der geplante Beschluss der Innenminister klingt aber auch so ziemlich bedrohlich.

https://web.de/magazine/politik/zugriff-alexa-smart-home-geraete-innenminister-planen-gesetzesaenderung-33775004

Boeing admits 737 Max sims didn't accurately reproduce what flying without MCAS was like

dvvdvv

false flag! false flag!

Come on, 77th Brigade, that's a cheap shot at the venerable aircraft manufacturer. Everybody knows it's in fact a дезинформационная кампания русских троллей.

dvvdvv

Feel free to subpoena my financial records.

dvvdvv

It's been in the news since last October/November. Hasn't helped the Ethiopian crew much.

dvvdvv

Re: Pre tell.

I don't know who you're talking about.

dvvdvv

Re: You are Mr...

No.

dvvdvv

It was Captain Ted Thompson and FO William Tansky,. And no, it didn't work IRL.

dvvdvv

Re: Say, what?

Check your sources — the computers didn't put AF447 into a stall, the pilot did. "The computers" OTOH correctly identified their inability to make decisions based on the available information and put themselves out of the loop.

dvvdvv

How much of a "roller coaster" can you do at 2000' to 5000' AGL above a very mountainous terrain? And they didn't need it, anyway — all they had to do was use the goddamn ANU button. Just like Boeing and FAA wrote in November. And the button was perfectly functional when the electric trim was on (see 05:40:14 and 05:40:29), right before they cut the electric trim off.

Nothing happened at 05:43:11. There were two senseless clicks on the ANU button at 05:43:14 and 05:43:15, followed by apparent re-enabling of the electric trim in the next two seconds. MCAS, of course, kicked right back in, but there were no input on the ANU button anymore. I would guess full-on panic had already set in by then.

dvvdvv

Which part about dealing with MCAS was removed from the manuals 30 years ago? And at which moment the electric trim was re-enabled with MCAS worsening the situation?

dvvdvv

Knowing for a fact that the nickname I'm using here is anything but random, I'm pretty sure you have as much clue about aviation safety as about that nickname.

dvvdvv

I don't remember AVH having an answer to that.

dvvdvv

Re: Stop getting hit by my fists.

First, the Airbus dropped 4000 feet before the pilots cold arrest the descent. Second, it took the crew and the company engineers more than half an hour to make the airplane behave again — and even then they got lucky, as they turned off the only air data reference unit (not just a probe) that provided correct data, but it still helped as one of the erroneous ADRs had already been turned off, and the stall prevention system required at least two ADRs working in agreement. (BTW, the system correctly identified the same probe malfunction in the AF447 case, but we all know how _that_ ended ). Third, Boeing and FAA issued an emergency AD much sooner than 35 days after the Indonesian crash, 9 days to be exact. Fourth, did I mention the Airbus dropped 4000 feet uncommanded?

dvvdvv

Re: Stop getting hit by my fists.

I'm sorry about your attention, but no.

dvvdvv

Flight crew always need training. Particularly when the manufacturer and the regulator issue emergency bulletins.

dvvdvv

How well should "well" be? All the Ethiopian crew needed was right there in the bulletin issued right after the Indonesian crash. Flight crew complacency is even deadlier than that of the manufacturer.

dvvdvv

Re: Stop getting hit by my fists.

Obviously, because Boeing engineers are not as perfect as you are. Come to think of it, Airbus engineers are not as perfect either — they just been a bit lucky when their version of stall prevention system failed on D-AIDP in November, 2014. So yeah, both the industry behemoths should put your perfect self in charge of the system.

dvvdvv

This "thought process" is a panic response contrary to their supposed training (the Boeing MCAS bulletin included).

dvvdvv

Well, yeah, none of the occurrences you see daily on avherald.com should have happened, requiring the crew to achieve what should not need achieving in the first place. And yet there they are. The flight crew are there for a reason.

dvvdvv

They could. You use the electric trim to remove the load and _then_ turn the electric trim off. MCAS doesn't interfere while you're pressing the trim nose-up button on the yoke, and when you let go of the button, the MCAS rate _is_ limited, so you've got plenty of time to turn it off before the trim moves too far, and have the trim in the range where it's easy to trim manually.

dvvdvv

You use the electric trim to remove the load and _then_ turn the electric trim off. MCAS doesn't interfere while you're pressing the trim buttons on the yoke.

dvvdvv

Boeing instructions did say in November:

Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any

stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be

used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB

TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT.

[end quote]

The Ethiopian crew just didn't follow them.

Buffer overflow flaw in British Airways in-flight entertainment systems will affect other airlines, but why try it in the air?

dvvdvv

Re: Entertainment system pen testing

Windows? Please... Pretty much all of them IFEs run Linux/Java now, and crash spectacularly all the same.

Boeing 737 pilots battled confused safety system that plunged aircraft to their deaths – black box

dvvdvv

Re: Lack of systems thinking

How do you know that 2 sensors malfunction if they show reasonably close values? True story, happened to an Airbus A321 in 2014.

dvvdvv

The only problem is that much more people died per flight or per person-mile back when there were no FADECs and ADRs. But rant away, I feel your pain.

dvvdvv

Re: Aircraft Systems

The trim. Runs. Away. You do the "runaway trim" memory item. If you don't, it does it again. And again. And again. And yes, you disable it exactly the same way you disable any other auto-trim — you disconnect the servo with those same switches.

dvvdvv

You very rarely need the gear when you deal with in-flight control problems.

dvvdvv

This feature is pretty much covered by long-established procedures already. There are no new switches to flip, no new actions to perform to deal with its faults.

dvvdvv

Re: Question

Yes and yes.

dvvdvv

Re: Question

The trim is off. You feel it on the wheel. You correct it. The damn wheel rotates away again. And again. And again. It's hard not to notice. 2.5 seconds or no 2.5 seconds.

dvvdvv

Re: Question

The previous crew realized that the system was trimming the elevator wrong (it's kinda hard to miss) and knew how to disable it.

Redundancy (sometimes it's hard to tell if and which sensors are malfunctioning) and full handoff to humans (they happen to lose their minds anyway) don't always work either.

dvvdvv

Re: Hey software, get the fuck out of the way!

You don't really need any special MCAS training — a runaway trim is a runaway trim no matter what the cause is. And dealing with a runaway trim is a well-established and relatively simple procedure.

dvvdvv

Re: Hey software, get the fuck out of the way!

Another bullshit. The software didn't force AF447 into the ocean — the software correctly detected that it couldn't make decisions based on the malfunctioning sensors and put itself out of the loop, making it very clear to the pilots. It was the pilots who dropped the plane into the ocean.

dvvdvv

Re: Hey software, get the fuck out of the way!

Bullshit. The pilot always has the ultimate say, be it Airbus or Boeing.

dvvdvv

Re: Hey software, get the fuck out of the way!

Multiple redundant do fail, too. In one prominent case, two of the three AOA sensors failed on an A321, which made the safety system to ignore the only sensor that was working and trim the airplane into a dive. The correct mitigating action was to disable the misbehaving system, and that was exactly what the crew of that A321 did. And that's what the crew of the penultimate fight of the crashed Boeing did, too. Everybody lived.

NASA chief in Moscow: 'We will fly again on a Russian Soyuz rocket'

dvvdvv

Uncomfortable landing?

It was a normal Soyuz landing. The reentry module ("the capsule" for the journos) might flip on its side in strong winds and on uneven terrain after the touchdown, but that's about it. It happens.

Russian 'troll factory' firebombed – but still fit to fiddle with our minds

dvvdvv

Re: Reichstag fire

The Russian population is in fact the primary target of the operation, and the operation's main objective is to discredit whatever passes as the Russian opposition to the regime. But if it burns down, not many will notice — it's not Reichstag by any means.

BTW and IMHO, the American election thing was done mostly for shits and giggles, the guys and gals didn't expect all the brouhaha and were really amazed how the Americans lost their shit about it.

Pain spotting: Russia's Aeroflot Docker server lands internal source code, config files on public internet

dvvdvv

You mean the site has never crashed at least in the last 10 years? Not bad, not bad at all.

dvvdvv

To segue from my previous comment: have there been any successful attacks against Aeroflot during the years the code has been exposed? I mean, other than the nation-state cyber attack against their VPN?

dvvdvv

No security without obscurity!

DNS resolver 9.9.9.9 will check requests against IBM threat database

dvvdvv

Re: Smut Blocker

Addresses on 192.168.0.0/16 are free ;)

dvvdvv

Re: Does not work very well

TMI.

dvvdvv

And they aren't logging queries for these address? Right…

Fancy that, Fancy Bear: LoJack anti-laptop theft tool caught phoning home to the Kremlin

dvvdvv

Are you claiming you are not a quadruple NSA/יחידה 8200/GCHQ/Роскомнадзор agent embedded here to plant FUD amongst us? Ah yes, that's _exactly_ what a quadruple agent would claim…

Anyway, my point is that ElReg gratuitously slapped Kaspersky and "Russian state-backed hackers" together again, while conveniently forgetting to mention that it was the Kaspersky folks who unearthed the LoJack vulnerability in the first place.

dvvdvv
Trollface

And oh, you guys, take a guess: are Виталий Камлюк и Сергей Белов now or have they ever been m̶e̶m̶b̶e̶r̶s̶ associated with Kaspersky Lab?

dvvdvv

So wait. Fancy Bear are still using those domains? What a bunch of idiots…

UK Foreign Sec Bojo to tell Kremlin: Stop your cyber shenanigans... or else!

dvvdvv

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