Stop whining about TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1, both are secure enough
The advantage of TLSv1.2 over TLSv1.1 & TLSv1.0 is small, and irrelevant in practice. Both, TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 have all security properties guaranteed for TLSv1.2 rfc5246 Appendix F.
While allowing TLSv1.2 is trivial for servers, proposing TLSv1.2 for clients still results in interop problems. Send a ClientHello with ClientHello.client_version = TLSv1.2 and no TLS extensions to a Microsoft Schannel 2008R2 or 2012R2, and it'll choke and abort the handshake. Send the very same wrapped as SSLv2Hello, and it'll succeed the TLS handshake (albeit selecting TLSv1.1).
Similarily, if you have (accidentally) enabled SSLv2 in addtion to TLSv1.2 in MSIE 11, and try to connect to a server that supports and negotiates TLSv1.2 in response, Microsoft SChannel (MSIE) chokes and aborts.
btw. just look at the huge amount of Microsoft Software that requires non-trivial end-user opt-in to enable TLSv1.2:
Stuff based on WinHTTP, such as WebDAV in Microsoft Office needs a hotfix *PLUS* adding registry keys:
Situation with Microsoft .NET is similar:
Stop whining about TLSv1.0. All attacks are either purely theoretical, or desperately require all three web browser design flaws (1) unlimited automatic silent downgrade dance, (2) execution of arbitrary attacker-supplied active content and (3) universal cross-site-request-forgery for silly demos.