Re: The cloud
So you mean that the Chinese now play the American Game ? How fucking horrible. The yellow danger can now even replicate American evilness after having replicated American economic methods !!!!!!!
7 posts • joined 2 Sep 2013
You are obviously very naive. The most fervent proponents of anything do it usually from a comfy chair or otherwise far behind the front line. For some sorts of actors, this might even be a necessity, as the sound of bullets flying over your head does reduce your effectiveness in breaking codes or analysing and attacking an electronic system.
You can still acquire some sorts of wounds from that activity, though:
+ Make it a true Mixnet and establish hundreds of routes to be used for a single virtual connection. Split the traffic randomly into small (about 1K or less) packets and use a random route out of the hundreds of established routes.
+ Generate constant chaff traffic and don't allow real traffic to change the observable traffic volume quickly over time.
+ Get your ego under control and contribute code strong-pseudonymously, signed with gnupg. Enhances your effectiveness as a FOSS developer in this area massively.
+ Make the directory truly distributed so that powerful authorties can't easily take it down or look at the directory traffic. That's a tall order, as you have to take into account evil players manipulating directory elements under their control, but there exist counter-measures to that threat.
First, TOR policies (Guard, Exit,...) could be randomly mutated by a script upon each TOR startup.
Secondly, as already mentioned, bury your confidential traffic under a mountain of irrelevant chaff like music, video or download traffic.
Thirdly, FOSS developers should create a kind of Super-TOR, which continously transmits crypto traffic between nodes. At a constant rate. Don't increase or slow traffic rate based on the real payload traffic. At least not as a short-term reaction. Sounds like waste ? Well, good security does not come for free.
The last approach was how governments stopped traffic-analysis attacks against their diplomatic traffic. They simply transmitted around the clock at constant rates.
Have been looking into this a few years ago and I remember public papers on the subject. They all state that NSA/GCHQ-class actors could indeed do quite a few passive and active things to correlate traffic back from the exit node towards the concealed endpoint.
TOR is by no means perfect, but certainly it is a powerful tool to defeat all the commercial data collectors (from Amazon to Google) and it will make it quite difficult even for governments. The more people use it, the less chance they stand to perform traffic correlation.
Plus, you can use elite hacker tools like wget (recursively) to create "chaff" traffic over your DSL line, which will make it much more difficult to correlate traffic. Or just make it a habit to stream a radio station in the background.
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