I understand my history just fine, thanks. I even understand the issues in transitioning from the old to the new.
Problem is, even new protocols being developed today rely on trust. The internet still relies utterly on people to behave with honour. People don't. Governments especially don't.
It is a pain to transition to a new architecture. It will take decades and billions of dollars. Tough. It needs done. Best to start down the path and get it over with.
Unfortunately, we're in the process instead of having the technocrats try to transition us to shit like IPv6. This doesn't benefit the individual in any way, but instead makes them even more vulnerable, traceable and exposed. Yes, I understand IPv6 is from the beforetime when chowderheads still believed in trust. But any attempts to actual solve the problems in IPv6 such that individual privacy is made paramount (or start a post-IPv6 transition that will move us to such a protocol) are simply shouted down.
The technocrats are obsessed with making life easy for developers. (See: end-to-end model obsession, amongst many other things.) Anything that requires a poor developer to load a few extra libraries and understand a little bit about network when designing an application is apparently such a cosmic problem that everyone else should be rendered tracable all the time.
And IPv6 is just one example.
The BGP issue can be solved by making two routing tables on the net. One secure and one insecure. BGP, of course, being insecure. Systems advertising along secure channels would have a multi-point reputation system. Some central registrar (preferably multiple, in different jurisdictions) would ensure that A) yes, the organization in question has the right to post routes and has agreed to play nice and B) owns X routes, and can advertise them as they wish.
If an organization tries to advertise routes on the secure channel that belong to someone else (which should be fairly easily traceable with the reputation system above) then those routes aren't accepted, and the reputation of the sender is demoted.
If there ever appear to be two "legitimate" owners of a route - which shouldn't happen, but does from time to time due to administrative screw-ups - then the providers with the highest reputation wins, until the issue is resolved.
BGP routes would then be considered as the lowest reputation routes. They will be accepted, but only if they are not overridden by a more reputable and verified source using the secure channel.
Oh look, we now have a transition mechanism. That was hard.
Yes, the reputation managers in this system would have many of the same flaws as certification authorities. This can be partially mitigated by having multiple reputation managers in multiple jurisdictions, making it hard (though admittedly not impossible) to compromise all of them.
We could also look at some sort of distributed reputation system (blockchain-based? It's all the rage!) that supplements the "canonical" reputation systems, but is based more on "number of times an advertiser has caused route problems".
Essentially the transition mechanism could be handled as something along the lines of a more advanced SPAM blacklist/greylist system, incorporating lessons learned from those attempts and giving ultimate priority to those advertisers who have done the leg work to get properly verified and whose ownership of a route can be confirmed through multiple sources.
Clearly, however, this is completely unworkable and impossible. Because reasons.
Trust is anathema to privacy and to security. Relying on it for anything is ridiculous.