> Outlook IS an amazing piece of work.
It's mainly embarassing. It's just a beast of "user friendliness with a Tony Blair grin" and frankly grossly overengineered features.
16005 publicly visible posts • joined 3 Jun 2008
It's easy to detect crims: It's the ones who worry!
The rest are taking their described daily dose of SOMA. 0.4g every morning. And take care boys and girls: Only read websites approved by the psychopathic mavens of interior and foreign policy!
> If only it didn't cost so much for hosts.
Oh, I thought CPU-wise. You mean the certificate.
Well, you can implement certificate-less SSL.
Or you can get a certificate at Gandi for EUR 12/year ... though they may revoke it at the drop of a hat ... they are french after all, never sure whether they are serving the State or the Customer.
Since malware relies on having access to the whole computer in order to do harm when the code is executed, malware on such a machine will be defeated, because even if it manages to get into the machine as a bona fide piece of code, as soon as it runs, it will find it has no direct access to anything except an area of RAM. It can’t mess with the operating system because it will run in user mode. It can’t mess with the mass storage because only kernel processes can reach the physical addresses of peripherals.
It seem the author has totally bypassed any knowledge about how modern computer systems or even malware actually works and is making things up as he writes? It's like listening to a neocon explaining the political situation in the Middle East and how we need to smash in some doors lest people get uppity etc.
I recommend taking up a good old Tanenbaum explaining principles of Operating Systems. Then to start studying practical examples of how security is being bypassed by various means in case the system is not kept at minimal levels of complexity with a strictly enforced and mathematically describable security policy with no bugs in the code underlying it. These systems are very rare, very restricted in functionality and the hoi polloi doesn't want them.
The combination of kernel and user register sets in the CPU with hardware memory management and a small amount of hard-wired logic that no software of any kind could circumvent, meant that with a competent operating system, these machines were essentially bomb proof.
Bomb proof my arse: Morris worm says no. Oh you mean it needs to run VMS? Right.
Sounds like a remake of that movie with Louis de Funès The Gazebo where he tries to get rid of a very hard-to-get-rid-of body.
It's not about "privacy".
"Privacy" refers to contracting between you and the provider handling your data.
"Safe harbour" refers to contracting between the provider handling your data and the provider handling the platform that holds your data.
Or in other words: in how many salesforce accounts does personal information about your actually reside, all with the requisite privacy guarantees promised in good faith. Do you know?
The reverse of that position is: if you cannot sell the goods at the price needed to pay your high-salaried employees (and pay your high taxes to boot and throw off a profit for, you know, "justification of existence"), then you are rolling towards the "cessation of activities" terminal activity node.
Cheap stuff from India? Yes we can.
Superiority by Arthur C. Clarke.
Written at the time when electronic valves where a thing.
However, based on blueprints of the facility obtained by FORBES – and published here for the first time — experts estimate that the storage capacity of the data center is lower than has previously been reported given the technology currently available and the square footage that the center has allocated for its servers.
(...)
Even that reduced number struck Internet infrastructure expert Paul Vixie as high given the space allocated for data in the facility. He came up with a lower estimation. Assuming larger 13 square feet racks would be used, factoring in space between the racks, and assuming a lower amount of data storage per rack, he came up with an estimate of less than 3 exabytes of data capacity for the facility. That would only allow for 24-hour recordings of what every one of Philadelphia’s 1.5 million residents was up to for a year. (But who would want to watch that?) Still, he says that’s a lot of data pointing to a 2009 article about Google planning multiple data centers for a single exabyte of info.
Thumbs up for remembering that gem of utter psychosis and paranoia.
Sweat made Stafford’s forehead slick with moisture. “Do you know what would cause a Genux-B to conclude that we’re under attack? A million separate factors, all possible known data weighed, compared, analyzed—and then the absolute gestalt. In this case, the gestalt of an imminent attacking enemy. No one thing would have raised the threshold; it was quantitative. A shelter-building program in Asiatic Russia, unusual movements of cargo ships around Cuba, concentrations of rocket freight unloadings in Red Canada…”
“No one,” the man at the controls of the flapple said placidly, “no nation or group of persons either on Terra or Luna or Domed Mars is attacking anybody. You can see why we’ve got to get you over there fast. You have to make it absolutely certain that no orders emanate from Genux-B to SAC. We want Genux-B sealed off so it can’t talk to anybody in a position of authority and it can’t hear anybody besides us. What we do after that we’ll worry about then. ‘But the evil of the day—’ ”
“You assert that in spite of everything available to it, Genux-B can’t distinguish an attack on us?” Stafford demanded. “With its manifold data-collecting sweepers?” He thought of something then, that terrified him in a kind of hopeless, retrospective way. “What about our attack on France in ‘82 and then on little Israel in ‘89?”
“No one was attacking us then either,” the man nearest Stafford said, as he retrieved the tape and again placed it within his briefcase. His voice, somber and morose, was the only sound; no one else stirred or spoke. “Same then as now. Only this time a group of us stopped Genux-B before it could commit us. We pray we’ve aborted a pointless, needless war.”
It can only be on tape.
That's still half a trillion LTO6 tapes. How large is that cube?
I can only imaginge NSA has some very special compression algorithms or this is the target number for end of the decade.
Could that much data have even been pumped into Utah over fibre up to now?
Where is "The tragedy of the IPv6"?