Reply to post: As designed, as simulated, as tested, and as routinely built.

As designed, as simulated, as tested, and as routinely built.

"As specified, as designed, as simulated, as tested, and as routinely built. "

They're all guaranteed to be the same, aren't they. Except when they aren't.

If these defectively-manufactured things 'routinely escape' the factory quality assurance process (which according to recent Boeing announcements apparently is also going to be cost-reduced), what happens next? It won't be the Boeing boardroom that pay the price, that much is already clear.

For a 737-related example from decades ago, look at the case of the "bear straps" which didn't fit in the factory assembly process, unless holes were drilled in places where holes weren't supposed to be:

TAYLOR SMITH: One of the shop managers sent me emails saying they were having problems with the fail-safe chords, which were the long ribs which go all around the aircraft, they go half way around and then they join up to the ribs that come up from the bottom. They were telling me that from the beginning of the 1996 time frame when they started manufacturing these parts and they were having shy edge margins and they were out of contour.

Boeing's internal documents which we have obtained, give a snapshot of the scale of the problem.

'Part out of contour, quantity 1.'

'Part Width - oversize, quantity 4.'

'Material thin, quantity 6.'

'Part under cut - quantity 26.'

'Poor mis-located, quantity 17.'

[continues - have a read for yourself at

https://www.sbs.com.au/news/sites/sbs.com.au.news/files/transcripts/381701_dateline_awingandaprayer_transcript.html

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