Reply to post: A couple of other points

Decoding the Chinese Super Micro super spy-chip super-scandal: What do we know – and who is telling the truth?

Bitsminer
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A couple of other points

...because similar motherboards were in use "in Department of Defense data centers, the CIA’s drone operations, and the onboard networks of Navy warships."

Uhhhh, nope. Chinese-manufactured motherboards cannot be sold to US governement agencies, especially military or intelligence. Stuff has to come from one of a trusted list of countries called TAA (Trade Agreements Act, FAR 52.225-5). China is not on this list.

Just try to find a disk drive not made in China. Thailand maybe? Been there, had to find that. Did.

..."the middlemen would organize delivery of the chips to the factories."

Wow. Just wow. This is classic misdirection. The Intelligence folks are trying (and largely succeeding with Bloomberg, el Reg, WaPo, etc) to focus attention on one vulnerability, namely surreptitious factory modifications. But there are more, so many more. A few hints:

o Connectors. Yes, those boring black thingies with wires going in, and out. Embedding a chip within a connector requires no BMC changes, is difficult to check even with Xray, and completely unobservable. And since there is exactly one connector model that fits in exactly one place, no wastage. Profit!

o Firmware "adjustments" as many others have suggested. But where? Not just SMI flash but ... power supply flash. RAM controller firmware. CPU firmware. Or simply radio transcievers embedded in the board (or connector) that introduce firmware changes at boot time. (Where is the transmitter? Hmmm...maybe power supply RF emissions?)

o Known zero-day vulnerability in....CPU (obviously), BMC firmware (also obviously), but: Ethernet chips, memory controller chips (like RowHammer), PCI bridge chips, etc

o NSA black bag ops. However, at the scale of Amazon, Apple, etc, probably not cost effective. Except see my next point.

One thing not mentioned by El Reg, is the scale of procurement by Amazon, Apple, etc. Unless merely for development purposes, these companies purchase servers by the container-load (where the container is pre-loaded with racking, switches, power, servers, etc). Thousands of servers per container. The assembler might be persuaded to mung things up. It seems a remote possibility but the supply chain risks at this point (well after the motherboard factory) have not been addressed in the press that I can see.

+1 for El Reg and very well reported. Thanks.

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