"the timer resolution making those exploits possible has been not so much reduced but rather obliterated in Palemoon specifically, and that the other browsers also did more or less the same thing already"
or so they say...
but the thing is, it doesn't eliminate the potential threat. It helps to mitigate what we currently know about the proof of concept algorithm. It is still possible, if you know enough about an OS or an application, to obtain information about it using a side-channel attack, if you repeat the operation sufficiently enough. I have personally used low resolution timers to check performance. if you test 10,000 operations with a timer that has 10msec or even 100msec accuracy, you can still determine how much time was spent doing those operations with reasonable accuracy. you won't be able to time a single operation, but you can time 10,000 of them. And THAT means an exploit will simply have to run LONGER to get a meaningful result, and target what it looks at a bit more carefully.