"Android security problems are pretty much non existent.."
In 2003, the vast majority of applications installed (legitimately) on a Windows PC were still installed from physical media. The "internet" was still a relatively new territory, and Microsoft - in their usual style - were completely wrong-footed when it came to the challenges that this might bring, namely the ability to piggy-back viruses and other nasties onto the back of emails, attachments etc that could then propagate themselves across networks and via email by plundering address books.
Fast-forward to 2017, and the benefit of over a decade of experience. Android was built with a connected world in mind, and as a result is fundamentally more secure to the attack vectors that plagued early 2000s Windows PCs. However, if you want to install any software on Android, your options are either to get it from the Play store, or turn on sideloading capabilities and download it from another source. This latter option is considered risky, to the point where the argument has been posed to remove the ability. And the former option? Well,
In short, the attack targets have moved on in accordance with direction technology has taken, based on profit and easy of access - and considering that it costs a mere $25 to submit as many apps as you want to the store of the highest-market-share mobile OS, coupled with said store's front-line policing being purely algorithmic, it is not surprising that, to quote, "It's 2017 and you can still pwn Android gear with [insert attack vector here]".
Security is, and always will be, a consistent predator-prey type chase - and anyone who claims that a system's security problems "are pretty much non existent" is either using something that is completely disconnected from everything, or has drunk the cool-aid of their vendor of choice.