Infected with Petya ransomware? This tool will rescue your data An anonymous security researcher has published code that can unlock the encryption used by the Petya ransomware that surfaced last month. The ransomware – first spotted hitting German computer users – reboots the infected Windows PC, pretends to run a CHKDSK program while encrypting the hard drive's file system tables, …
". . . If enterprises don't start making strides towards defensible architecture today, massive ransoms may end up getting paid tomorrow."
Nothing is perfect, but I am disappointed that the all inclusive word "enterprises" is used here instead of mentioning exactly whom this is referring to. At the extremes there are a number of operating systems which are indeed working specifically on this task. Even some more common ones make this an important consideration. I feel that some very hard working software architects are being unfairly put down here.
". . . If enterprises don't start making strides towards defensible architecture today, massive ransoms may end up getting paid tomorrow."
I think that the comment refers to designs that assume that everything can be trusted unless something exceptional happens, which are the common baseline. The opposite design philosophy of not trusting anything unless explicitly allowed is much more uncommon, especially in enterprise networks (see last week news about Google moving to a no-trust network design)
The Register 
Biting the hand that feeds IT
Copyright. All rights reserved © 1998–2024
