I would do it the same way.
A researcher who in January helped highlight possible flaws in Intel's Software Guard Extensions' input-output protection is back, this time with malware running inside a protected SGX enclave. Instead of protecting the system, Samuel Weiser and four collaborators of Austria's Graz University of Technology write that the proof …
Not so good news for Intel.
But the question of course is would any other architecture do better?
I hope Intel won't start spinning PR BS about "this can't be done with a real system because it needs hardware access. Blah blah"
Looks like once again the world learns that a system can be so simple there are no bugs in it or so complex there are no obvious bugs in it, which is something else.
This is not the purpose of SGX. If your code is not resilient from side channel attacks, putting it into an enclave will obviously not solve it. Intel never claimed otherwise
What this article shows is how the attack can be launched undetected in a non-compromised OS. Very interesting.
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