* Posts by Allevate

3 publicly visible posts • joined 6 Jul 2012

If you're wondering how Brit cops' live suspect-hunting facial-recog is going, it's cruising at 88% false positives

Allevate

Excellent result!

Somebody was taken off the streets that should not have been there.

It's shoddy reporting to say this is an inaccuracy rate of 87%.

In inaccuracy rate of 87% would mean more than 7,000 false alerts would have been generated.

The number of false positives is steady and predictable.

The number of genuine positives is based on the number of people in the watchlist that was actually there.

If nobody wanted actually turned up on the day, does that mean the system is 100% inaccurate?!

Facial Recognition Accuracy: A Worked Example :

https://allevate.com/2019/11/26/facial-recognition-accuracy-example/

MPs to gaze upon biometric data industry's ID-gobbling tech

Allevate

Why does the author think IRIS was a failure

I firmly support parliamentary oversight of this technology.

I would like to query, completely separately to this, why the author feels the IRIS programme was a failure?

My views on this matter can be found here:

http://allevate.com/blog/index.php/2012/02/17/does-turning-off-the-iris-system-at-manchester-and-birmingham-represent-a-failure-of-biometrics/

Border Agency comes out with another e-Borders deadline

Allevate

Does Turning Off the IRIS System Represent a Failure?

I admit the gates were not perfect and did require some getting used to in order to navigate your way through quickly.

But I think the systems were far from a failure, and the reality is a little bit more subtle than the headlines may suggest.

Let’s not forget the system was originally introduced in 2004, initially as a pilot. At this time, such use of Iris technology was fairly innovative. That the footprint of the pilot was gradually extended and became a permanent system is indicative that the system was fairly well received. The fact that over 380,000 people have voluntarily enrolled (myself included) makes it difficult to argue that the system is derided.

In my opinion, the turning off of the system at these two locations is more in line with a planned phasing out of this particular solution, for some rather more mundane reasons:

1. The system no longer fits border-automation strategy in the UK moving forward. It has largely been replaced by the momentum to accommodate EU e-Passports holders,whose passports hold an electronic copy of their face photographic.

2. As innovative as the technology was in 2004, it is now woefully out-of-date. Iris technology has moved on leaps-and-bounds in the 8 years since (as demonstrated by the Iris-at-a-distance e-gate solutions for departing passengers at Gatwick airport). The initial investment undoubtedly has long since been written off, and the technology needs a refresh.

3. The initial deployment was meant to be limited, and the contract has undoubtedly been extended numerous times. A complete and expensive technology refresh (as is required) without an open and competitive re-tender would undoubtedly not rest on firm legal ground.

4. The business model was never well thought out. It is completely funded by the UK government and can be used by any nationality completely free of charge.

This Iris system is intended for pre-registered Trusted Travellers, who are pre-vetted before they can use the system. At point of use, it is a 1:n Iris check and no travel documents are required.

Since the system has been deployed, most European Union (EU) nations have deployed e-Passports and an ever-increasing percentage of the EU population is now carrying a chip passport. The Iris gates have been gradually been superseded by a new breed of e-Gates that:

- are for EU passport holders only.

- do not require pre-enrolment.

- perform a 1:1 face check against the JPG on the passport chip.

These gates are now being widely deployed at UK ports of entry and seemingly form the backbone of the government’s strategy for automated passenger clearance. This is only natural, as by far the bulk of passengers entering the UK are EU citizens.

If the remaining Iris gates are end-of-life’d, this will clearly leave a hole in the border automation strategy, mainly those passengers that:

- are not EU citizens.

- are EU citizens but do not yet have an e-passport.

Arguably, the second of the two will become less of a problem as time passes, as holders of older passports have their passports renewed.

The former, however, will form a minority of arriving passengers, and the business case for the government to provide a free-to-use Trusted Traveler system remains vague. More likely than not, any replacement system will take the form of a paid subscription requiring a pre-enrollment with vetting.

Ideally, given the limited space available airports, the best scenario would involve these passengers using the same physical e-gates as EU passport holders.

In my view, allowing these systems to reach their end-of-life is not an argument for the failure of biometrics deployed at the border. The fact that a system that was only ever meant to have a limited deployment lasted this long and was only replaced by a government strategy that is more harmonised across EU nations, is a testament to the value this technology provides.