Re: Tsk @Bloakey1
Joe Rocheforte and his boys did their jobs, and did them well, allowing Nimitz to send out what was left of the American fleet to engage. Problem: Yorktown had been severely damaged in the previous battle. It should not have been possible to make repairs in time. They almost sailed with civilian dockworkers on board; the last repairs were made by the crew, en route to Midway. Problem: Halsey was sick, with a severe rash. They needed a replacement, quick. The only one available was a career cruiser man named 'Spruance'. Spruance was senior to Fletcher, the other admiral available, and so had overall command despite being a career surface forces man. No-one knew, then, that he was the greatest carrier admiral there ever was or would be.
The bad luck for the Americans started when a PBY patrol aircraft spotted the Japanese alpha strike going in towards Midway, and radioed in 'many planes headed Midway', notably leaving out minor details such as overall strength and composition. The good luck started when the cruiser Tone, one of the escorts for the Kido Butai, had a problem with it catapult and was late launching it recon aircraft. By sheer luck, the area that Tone's aircraft was supposed to patrol was the area containing the American fleet. The recon seaplane was late getting there due to the late launch, and when it did detect American ships didn't see a carrier... and so reported back. For over an hour Nagumo didn't know that there were American ships at sea, and for another half hour he didn't know that there was at least one carrier. That turned out to be critical.
Further bad luck for the Americans followed when the Japanese alpha strike hit Midway, and effectively destroyed the American air defense; only two out of 28 fighters remained airworthy when the Japanese left. The alpha strike suffered some loses, and other aircraft, including that of the strike commander, were damaged.
Additional bad luck for the Americans came when all of the B-17s based on Midway attempted to bomb the Kido Butai, scoring no hits. Next came the Midway-based torpedo bombers: two B-26s and five TBFs. Three TBFs were shot down, and all the other aircraft damaged. One B-26 attempted to ram the Kido Butai's flagship (what, you thought that it was _Japan_ who invented the Kamikaze?) but failed when the pilot lost consciousness from loss of blood and the co-pilot didn't think that it was a good day to die.
The alpha strike commander had radioed in that there was a need for a second strike at Midway. The B5N heavy attack aircraft ('Kate' to the US) could carry bombs for land attack or torpedoes for anti-shipping. The dive bombers could carry thin-skinned bombs for attacking buildings or heavy bombs for anti-ship. The Kido Butai had retained some of both types when sending out the alpha strike. They were configured anti-ship. Nagumo ordered them reconfigured for land attack... before the bombers from Midway arrived. And before Tone's seaplane reported in that there was at least one American carrier at sea. While they were in the middle of all this, the torpedo planes from the American fleet started arriving. The 'American samurai' showed every intention of bringing their torpedoes as close as possible before launching, and, like the B-26 driver, several showed a definite intent to ram. Torpedo Squadron 8, from USS Hornet, sent 10 aircraft out, each with a crew of three. There was only one survivor. Not one surviving aircraft, one surviving aircrew. The American carrier torpedo planes pressed home their attack against everything the Japanese could throw at them. Torpedo 6, from Enterprise, sent 14 aircraft. They got back 4, all damaged. Torpedo 3, from Yorktown, sent in 12, got back 2, all damaged. Some American fighters were close enough to have supported the torpedo planes, if they had been so inclined. None were. One of the Torpedo 6 aircrew had to be pulled off a fighter pilot when he got back to the carrier. So far the US had lost twenty-plus fighters over Midway and another few damaged, plus all of the Midway-based torpedo planes either destroyed or sufficiently damaged as to be no longer airworthy, plus effectively all of three complete carrier torpedo squadrons and had zero hits from air-launched torpedoes. The only hits, three submarine-launched torpedoes from USS Archerfish, were duds. Japan had light losses.
Nagumo, badly scared by at least two attempts by American aircraft to ram not merely his flagship but the bridge deck from which he was watching the battle, ordered his carriers to stop rearming with bombs for land attack and rearm with torpedoes for anti-ship, and he did so while the last of the carrier torpedo planes were still attacking. Which meant that when the dive bombers of Scouting 6 and Bombing 6, off Enterprise, and Bombing 3, off Yorktown, arrived, the Japanese carriers were packed with aircraft being refueled (part of the alpha strike had returned) and rearmed. Perfect targets for heavy bombs. At 10:24 AM, 4 June 1942, Japan was winning the war. At 10:26, they had lost. It just took three more years to convince them.
When the Kido Butai was lost, it was more than just the ships. It was the aircrews, the best carrier aircrews in the world, the men who had owned the sea and the sky above it from China to Hawaii to Ceylon. It took fifteen months or more to train aircrews to that level. Japan didn't have 15 months to burn. In addition, all the deck crews who serviced the aircraft were lost with the carriers. They were as highly trained as the aircrews, and as completely irreplaceable. And, oh, the commander of the alpha strike took off in his damaged Kate to hunt American carriers, knowing that he only had fuel for a one-way trip. Japan lost a lot of their best commanders, too. (They didn't lose Nagumo. Pity. He should have been awarded the Medal of Honor for all that he did to make the American victory possible.)
The Americans took heavy loses: Yorktown was sunk, as was a destroyer, and they lost a lot of aircrew. But the Americans were already starting to mass-produce the Essex-class carriers, and they could turn out aircrew in six to nine months. Their crews weren't as good as the Japanese, but there were an awful lot of them, and in the words of Stalin, quantity has a quality all its own.
Japan had to cut corners on the training program, and it showed. By 1944 the best Americans were as good as most Japanese, and there were a lot of Americans. Spruance would send his aircraft up into the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot where hordes of Americans flying superior aircraft wiped out Japanese carrier air. By 1945 Japan was reduced to desperate measures; Saburo Sakai, one of the old hands from China who had been severely shot up over the Solomon Islands and lost an eye in the process (and flew back nearly 500 miles and made a successful landing just the same) was dragged out of retirement after 18 months on the ground, promoted to an officer (the severely class-conscious Japanese very rarely promoted enlisted men into the officer ranks) and told to fly escort for kamikazes. His flight had two other escorts, both green newbies, and a dozen or so kamikazes when they were intercepted by 18 Hellcats from US Pacific Fleet. Sakai told the newbies to get the kamikazes home, and held off the Hellcats by himself, shooting down three, before escaping back to base. Remember, he was blind in one eye... that's the calibre of the Imperial Japanese Navy's aircrews in the late 1930s to early 1940s. The best there ever was.
Spruance got them, anyway. With a lot of luck and a lot of assistance from Nagumo.