1-4) Explanatory, generally accurate.
5) If the handwriting is not on the wall, I won't believe it mentality. The part about the engines is true (also for the PAK-FA), but the F-35's round nozzles have much the same problem.
6) Lack of understanding about operational needs. The J-20 is a Pacific oriented design as opposed to F-22/PAK-FA's balanced design and JSF cost-saving, closer range design. Its defensive mission will be to patrol China's rather long borders. Its offensive mission will be to range deep over a lot of water. A tendency towards large-size/long-range is inevitable, which provides extra time on supercruise. The HMS actually equalizes maneuverability problems.
7) More best-case only thinking - at best a procrastination mentality and at worse downright dangerous. Even if they don't have LPI, for that to work, the Asian powers must have Meteor even though they generally use US rather than European systems (the US isn't as enthusiastic about developing a long shooter b/c they are using supercruise as a booster), the J-20 doesn't have a long shooter of its own, the Meteor must be equipped with a passive homing head, and the J-20 pilots have no idea of EMCON. If anything, passive homers are more dangerous to planes with LPI (and trust that it works), for they are more likely to remain in continuous emission, and if the LPI doesn't live up to its promises they are f*cked.
8) Between Japan, SK and Taiwan something approaching a chain may be argued in China's East "TVD." (certainly the Chinese think so). Even those generally lack IRSTs, since that is not a US priority. Nor do they have radars optimized to detect LO aircraft, same reason. In the South TVD are a bunch of countries that are so weak as to be best called "liabilities" in a major conflict. Australia has OTH radar supposedly with some anti-stealth but with JSFs it'll be hard for them to come far north enough to seriously threaten the Chinese without lots of US (tanker) support.
The weakness of the "mobile Taiwans" is that they don't have the size and survivability of Taiwan. Runways can be repaired in hours, but not carriers. The radars of the Aegis only have raw-power and standard signal processing as anti-stealth measures (thus inefficient relative to dedicated anti-stealth radar).
9) That means by the time they are detected, they are on tail intercepts. Against a large fighter with supercruising ability, this is highly disadvantageous.
As for the seaborne cruise missiles, ultimately cruise missiles are *strike*, not sustained *combat* weapons like aircraft are - if the carriers are deterred/elimintated from the game throw-weight drops, not to mention defensive power - even an Aegis cruiser is relatively vulnerable to air threats if not backed by air cover.
Also, the present generation of subsonic missiles have limited efficiency versus hardened aircraft shelters (low speed, relatively small warhead, profile disadvantageous for penetration...) Plus it ignores that China has its own cruise and ballistic missiles that can do the same to PACRIM airfields (or civilian targets), thus making countries more reluctant to support the US.
10) Most of the US allies are in Europe, not Asia. And even there, if the JSF continues to bloat in price like it does, it is unlikely a thousand would be bought (once upon a time the US should have bought 750 F-22s too before rationalizing away themselves to 187). And even then, it is not clear whether this economy (like the Virginia, it actually isn't much if any cheaper) plane will actually have an advantageous combat coefficient vs the Chinse and Russian designs.