Re: The MiG-29 was the 'cheap' option.
The original F/A-18 A thru D models were, it's the later E and F model Super Hornets that have supplanted the Tomcat.
2364 publicly visible posts • joined 21 May 2008
Yes you have to be a very good shot to get hits at anything over a few hundred yets, especially with the original fixed site. I think Screwball Beurling mastered the art of deflection shooting and was so good some of his kills didn't appear on the gun camera footage. Much easier to just get closer.
The later gyro gunsite improved the situation a lot as it took the guesswork out to an extent.
And when you own your own Spitfire you can paint it in an authentic finish.
Incidentally at least one Spitfire and one Seafire were stripped to a bare metal finish during the war. Not sure about the Spitfire but the Seafire was with the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron, I think on HMS Hunter, and can be seen in photos of the ship entering Singapore.
Some Hurricanes had 6 machine guns in each wing. Which sounds impressive but was less destructive than a couple of 20mm cannons (cannon rounds are explosive).
I think the standard for the RAF was to harmonise at 400 yards, although oddly I have it on reasonable authority the RN had a policy of harmonising at infinity.
'Most surviving Spits from the early years have had them replaced by the later Griffons' have you got a reference for that because I can't think of a single example where that's happened. It's certainly not a straight change of nose as you'd also need bigger underwing radiators, thicker wing skins, etc etc. The closest is where Griffon engined examples have had a Griffon from a Shackleton replace the original unit.
It's only divergent in pitch at AoA near the stall, hence MCAS only kicking in during manual flight, flaps up, at high angles of attack. Boeing allow the trim cut-out to disable MCAS, if the aircraft couldn't be flown without it that wouldn't be an option. The problem being if you're massively out of trim it's next to impossible to manually trim due to the forces through the system.
Technically it's not truly divergent, however the stick force required to raise the nose a given amount reduces at high AoA. So unless the pilots are aware of the issue the effect would be similar as the pitch rate would increase while they held the stick in a fixed position.
In a purely logical sense you may be correct about the relative risks. However airlines try to sell tickets to human beings who tend not to be purely logical and have different safety thresholds depending on whether or not they're in charge of the vehicle.
And those airlines are the people Boeing are trying to sell 737s to.
The throttles remained at the take-off setting throughout so they didn't open them up, they were always open. Secondary effect of controls, throttling back lowers the nose, the last thing they wanted to do with an aircraft whose primary controls are already fighting them to do that.
'Changing the throttle will push the nose up or down, so the MCAS is there to stop them from pushing the nose up too far and causing a stall'
Not the actual problem, the larger engine cowlings actually generate lift at high angles of attack pushing the nose higher up as detailed by a previous response. The engines could be turned off and it would still be a problem. Although not the biggest one you'd have at that point...
Reminds me of one of my favourite buffer over run stories. A missile was being developed, possibly AMRAAM I can't remember off-hand, and they had a problem with over runs. So in a move of genius they installed twice as much memory as would be needed in the longest possible flight, solving the problem.
Some years later they produced an improved range variant of the missile, predictably they forgot why they'd installed so much memory in the first place...
Generally depending on the classification of the problem the authorities grant some leeway in applying the AD. E.g. within next 28 days which gives the airlines some flex to incorporate it into the next scheduled down time. In this case they probably believe that the interim measure is safe enough that it doesn't require the AD to be applied immediately.
'How exactly does this wondrous 'new technology' replacing the need for humans holding fire hoses to, you know, fight fires?'
I'm assuming it's the wondrous 'new technology' which lets them have less aircraft, which means less bases, which means less fire fighters. So it's basically down-sizing.
Or maybe fire fighting equipment from this century, that way some of it might be serviceable...
'because if you are making an approach into a carrier landing in borderline or even moderate level the very *last* thing you need is a bloody variable cross wind.'
Which is why they always turn the carrier so there isn't a cross wind.
'It'll be even more damn fun in a VTOL because as I understand it, and I might be wrong, the F35 doesn't have the same control finesse as the Harrier.'
Presumably because you're making things up? Having had a brief from Commander Air on Queen Elizabeth the F-35 can manoeuvre at low speeds in ways that would have led to the Harrier crashing, which as he's flown the latter and seen the former during trials on QE I'll take as a more reliable source.
She's not fully operational for another couple of years though, and to be fair this happened on HMS Invincible when I was on her in 2003, so a few decades after she entered service. That was in the Captain's sea cabin though which made it the only time I've heard an emergency broadcast for a flood 10 decks above the waterline...
I can think of few areas of human endeavour less suited to government 'assistance' than tourism. This sounds like what 'top' civil servants think people do when they travel, rather than what actual humans do on holiday. An approach that worked brilliantly when they told the post-war aircraft industry what airliners to build...
What I find odd about this is that Microsoft still seem to be running the server that verifies your Flight Simulator licence* when you install it, and that was released in 2006. So how hard up are they that they can't run a DRM server?!
*For testing reasons I had to install it a couple of months ago so it definitely worked then.
'Ideally, Boeing should just admit that the 737 MAX isn't a 737, remove MCAS, and require all pilots who are to fly the thing to obtain certification for the new aircraft type.'
They can't remove MCAS as it wouldn't pass certification. They could provide more training on it (and I'd suggest a dedicated cut-out switch) which would remove the common type rating. This may lose them some sales, but that's better than losing all of them.
The Max is stable until it approaches the stall when the engine nacelles start to generate lift, reducing the stick force required to raise the nose.
For certification there's a requirement that it requires a given stick force to raise/lower the nose enough to change the speed by a set amount. The Max fails this without MCAS, designing it out would end up with a very different aircraft and require complete recertification. To minimise the training in the differences to keep a common type rating with earlier models, and make the costs attractive for airlines, they didn't mention MCAS in the conversion course.
Not quite true, many aircraft have pitch changes with a change in thrust. This is due to the centre of thrust being above or below the centre of drag/gravity. This doesn't make them unstable, continuing to change pitch once the change in thrust had happened would make them unstable.
The issue with the Max is that at high angles of attack the control force needed to increase pitch decreases due to lift from the engine nacelles. Which means if you hold the same back pressure the aircraft will continue to pitch up rather than stabilising at a new attitude/speed combination. This makes it unstable, and also required MCAS to meet certification requirements.
The Max actually has fairly benign flight characteristics until you get near the stall.
'I couldn't find anything detailing the weather conditions at the time, but assumed it was VFR below the cloud deck.'
They started out at ~35,000' and were scudding through the tops of the cumulonimbus from the inter-tropical convergence zone near the equator. To get the icing on the pitot tube they would have had to be in cloud at least part of the time, I believe they were in clear air when they pitched up, but then would have been in cloud most of the way down. The artificial horizon should have been working the whole time though as it gets its information from a gyroscope.
Your second paragraph is true, I know they've looked at it for military UAV operators but I'm not sure about airline pilots. I'm sure I've read something about it being tried in a simulator though.
TCAS doesn't work on ADS-B, it works on the Mode Creturn from the transponder so GPS failure wouldn't have any affect on it. TCAS predates widespread GPS availability and is fairly simple in operation, using two aerials to generate a phase difference in the received signal which can be used to give an approximate bearing, the time taken for a reply to generate range, and the altitude encoded in the return for the difference in height.
TCAS can be augmented by ADS-B, but that's mainly to reduce the interrogation rate, and as ADS-B isn't mandatory yet you couldn't rely on it for TCAS.
An interesting point considering at no point were the pilots having any problem with navigation. The problem was with ATC not being told where the aircraft was.
The E6B was certainly still part of the CPL syllabus when I did it back in 2012 so I doubt your last sentence holds.
'I would like to try to land a C-130 on a carrier, and then take off though... it can be done, it was done.'
For that you could try P3D, just remember there's also an academic licence if you want to use it for educational purposes. Like learning how hard it is to land a C-130 on an aircraft carrier...
Bit of an odd comparison, Heathrow is run by a private company and can do what it wants with its money if legal. The NHS is run by the government which can do what it wants with its money. That a budget of ~£152 billion can't find £59 million for CT scanners is hardly Heathrow's fault.
https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/
'attempting to set them into a position they were already in would feel immediately wrong even without looking'
There's a mental process called cognitive dissonance where you carry out an automatic action without realising it's the wrong one. It's possible all they were thinking was toggle that switch, and did, without registering which way up it was. I've read an account by a helicopter pilot who dropped an under-slung load rather than turn on the landing light, which must have been a bit of a surprise to all involved! In that case there were two switches on opposite sides of the control.
The main issue in the simulator wasn't the MCAS software but the physical effort required to move the trim wheel. When seriously out of trim applying elevator input to counteract the pitching moment creates sufficient force to jam the screw-jack that operates the trim, this makes it effectively impossible to manually trim. This was known about on the early 737, but the detail seems to have left the flight manual in the later 70s/early 80s. It advised relaxing the elevator force, trimming like a bastard, and then reapplying elevator before too much height was lost...
Apparently the simulator doesn't recreate those trim forces, which means no one really knows what they're going to experience.