It's worse than that, Jim
There's at least one more: 'direct' law. In normal law (which is all you'd ever expect to see, unless there had been multiple failures in redundant systems - pilots only encounter 'alternate' law in the sim) it is (almost) impossible to exceed the safe envelope. So heaving back on the stick (while bad practice and utterly alien to anyone who'd learnt to fly on, say, a Cessna) is normally quite safe - but in this case it was fatal. The change from normal to alternate law is shown on the flight computer, but there were a lot of simultaneous announcements when the problem occurred - before the recovery of the black boxes, the only data was from the in flight transmission of engineering data which showed about 80 (IIRC) warnings in a few seconds.
You're quite right that only one pilot should be handling the aircraft at any one time - which is why the behaviour of the sidestick controls is not normally a problem. But this does highlight the lack of tactile feedback for the non-handling pilot, which those brought up on Boeings tend to dislike.
Despite all this, it should have been a non-event. All pilots are supposed to have memorised the appropriate settings of power and aircraft pitch to be used in the event of failure of the airspeed indication, which would have allowed AF447 to simply fly through the cloud until the pitots unfroze and all returned to normal. No-one has come up with a very satisfactory explanation of why the handling pilot reacted as he did.