The encryption conundrum: Should tech compromise or double down? Silicon Valley should work with the US government in Washington to arrive at a solution that gives law enforcement access to encrypted comms, but that respects individual privacy. That's according to former White House counterterrorism and cybersecurity official Daniel Rosenthal, who was debating where the issue of encryption …
Now, he can push for the passage of new laws, and those would stand unless they were unconstitutional. Of course, what is constitutional or not can take a long time to establish and may not break the President's way.
Trump can also perhaps get some favorable rulings in different situations or different federal circuit courts than the ones that were involved in the San Bernadino case, where it definitely looked like judge was going to side with Apple until the FBI withdrew its request.
The actual problem is that the tech industry is heavily anti-Trump and anti-Republican in general, so the Republicans don't have a lot other than tax revenue to lose by torpedoing industry sales through forced collusion with the government.
Donald Trump is in a very good position to have a Supreme Court of the United Status (SCOTUS) of a very favourable political persuasion. He gets to nominate one justice now, and there are several that are likely to be replaced during his term. Liberals everywhere are unsettled at this.
This means, that when push comes to shove, it is likely restrictions on use of encryption will be found to be in accordance with the U.S. constitution. (The 'Snooper's Charter' law that has just received Royal Assent puts the U.K. further ahead of the U.S.A. than it already was in this regard).
While encrypted datastreams are practically indistinguishable from random data, the metadata around the stream will be hard to disguise from law enforcement equipped with the right tools. This means is is reasonably practical to ban the use of effective encryption, because it can be shown if you are using encryption that is not permitted. Examples will be made of techies who try to make end-runs around such a law, so the only people who will use effective encryption are those explicitly allowed to, and criminals who regard being prosecuted for using effective encryption as just one of a set of acts for which they could be prosecuted, and not the most important one.
At the moment, it is not illegal to use effective encryption. I would not be surprised if continual efforts are made to make it so. The mere possession of child pornography images is criminal: it would be easy to draft a law making illegal the mere possession of software capable of encrypting effectively.
It's going to be a bumpy ride.
This means is is reasonably practical to ban the use of effective encryption, because it can be shown if you are using encryption that is not permitted.
Simple option is encryption over an encrypted channel, they see the outer breakable encryption due to the connection metadata but not the payload, unless they break and scan everything. That starts to become a serious load on the systems, unless there is a golden key in every router, in which case it will be mere minutes before foreign governments and criminals also have it. Yes, I'll spare you the Venn diagram of those two.
it would be easy to draft a law making illegal the mere possession of software capable of encrypting effectively.
For the pelbs you might be right, but governments have a habit of listening to businesses that stand to lose billions due to security breaches and they sure as hell won't be happy with such an approach.
Administration and Congress spends 24 months getting a new law enacted.
Coders work over a weekend to release software legally circumventing the precise wording of the law.
Administration contemplates this for a few days, then arrests everyone involved anyway.
Legal system then grinds away for 13 years, destroying those involved.
I suppose that's possible, but I keep thinking about The Crypto Wars which the US Government completely lost, (at least as far as the export of strong encryption goes).
The arguments then seem the same as now and yet no lessons seem to have been learnt.
In TFA one side seemed to be arguing using logic and facts, and the other side seemed to be using wish fulfilment.
Maybe that's what you get from living in Washington for too long.
If Trump enacts doors forcing backdoors in encryption all it will achieve is the devastation of the US tech sector. Companies will relocate overseas, there's the potential for majors to offer overseas versions of apps that don't comply that everyone just ends up using etc. iOS "written" by Apple Ireland and downloaded from servers outside the US thus outside the law etc.The workarounds are endless, the law pointless, the damage huge.
Unfortunately the mindset that cannot grasp that secret backdoors are mathematically incompatible with secure and strong encryption also can't grasp that the US doesn't have a monopoly on the mathematics of encryption, and therefore doesn't understand that the only encryption they'll actually succeed in weaken ing will be that available to US citizens in the US.
" ... secret backdoors are mathematically incompatible with secure and strong encryption ..."
I agree but my maths is not up to producing a strict proof of this conjecture. Has there ever been an attempt to prove this conjecture? Was it successful?
I'll be somewhat gob-smacked if there is proof of the opposite - a crypto system can have a backdoor and be secure.
The problem is that even if you can make a system which is able to unlock the data without the original key and still be secure. Who do you give the backdoor to?
Field Marshal Haig,
Field Marshal Haig's wife,
all Field Marshal Haig's wife's friends, their families,
their families' servants, their
families' servants' tennis partners, and some chap I
bumped into the mess the other day called Bernard."
It almost seems the pro-encryption community sees the same slippery slope as the pro-firearms community. The pro-gun guys say the difference between an AR-15 and a Remington 740 with wood stocks is nil. The pro-crypt guys say the difference between encryption without a back door and true encryption is nil.
And the difference between uranium used in a reactor and uranium used in a bomb is nil. Physics here, and it's true: it's the same element involved, only some processing is the difference. That's why Iran is such a touchy issue: they have their own mine; this combined with knowledgeable scientists means they have the entire processing chain in-house. Short of World War III, there's no physical way to stop Iran from making nuclear weapons. It's a no-win situation, but still unacceptable because it also presents an existential threat. It's like staring up the mountain as the avalanche begins.
Yes it's you. The problem with the suggested backdoored encryption is one of mathematics. The person between Bob and Alice is an adversary. There is no value judgement on the adversary. Perhaps Bob and Alice are evil and the adversary is benevolent. The crux is that you can't make it easy for the good adversary without making it easy for the bad one. The best you could hope for is some sort of golden key, so then we turn to how we keep that protected. Given the US was unable to prevent early nuclear research finding its way into Soviet hands, what makes you remotely imagine that such a sweet honeypot would not be leaked. Those 20 million OPM records could easily be used to blackmail for access.
But let's just leave all those challenges aside for the moment and pretend there can exist a solution if we "try harder". Why would any terrorist use encryption that they know to be broken when they have the mathematically secure algorithms already in existence. You are throwing out the baby with the bathwater except not even managing to throw out the bathwater you wanted to dispose of.
No encryption is absolutely mathematically secure except for one-time pads, and even then you have to hide the pads. That's why al Queda tended to use trusted couriers, although even this isn't perfect, as couriers and the like can be doubled or tracked (what nailed bin Laden was that the US was able to crack and then track one of his inner circle).
"The problem with the suggested backdoored encryption is one of mathematics."
So, basically, you're saying that if they're determined and smart enough, there's no way to prevent World War III. Sobering thought. Man can destroy the world and there's nothing one can do about it...
"Man can destroy the world and there's nothing one can do about it..."
That has been the status quo for at least 60 years now. I'm dating this on hydrogen bombs becoming availiable. Looking back now, with de-classified information from various archives, "Dr. Strangelove" was much closer to the truth than you'd think. (But then again, Kubrick researched his topics very thorough.) During the Cuban Missile Crisis the world was about 20 minutes away from WW III. Communications played a key role - the Hot Line didn't exist yet. Sending urgent messages to the USSR involved the Pentagon's office boy cycling to the nearest branch of Western Union. In the end the Kremlin used Radio Moscow to announce that they would not break the blockade.
But one can actually do something about it. Like getting involved in politics (beyond clicking on 'like' buttons or ranting online). After all, if the wiser heads always give in, the idiots are in charge.
"So, basically, you're saying that if they're determined and smart enough, there's no way to prevent World War III."
Who are "they"?
It almost seems the pro-encryption community sees the same slippery slope as the pro-firearms community. The pro-gun guys say the difference between an AR-15 and a Remington 740 with wood stocks is nil. The pro-crypt guys say the difference between encryption without a back door and true encryption is nil.
It's a proven fact. Encryption depends on the secret key remaining secret. Once you have a "second secret" that can be used to decrypt any given message, people (good AND bad) will instead focus on acquiring said secret. It will be leaked, and then all crypto will be rendered useless.
It's hilarious because you were close with the pro-firearms analogy, but you got the analogy itself wrong. The correct one would be "outlaw secure crypto, and only outlaws will have it". And it's 100% correct.
Let's say the US government gets breakable encryption then I presume that a lot of encryption would then disappear. The logic being that if you have a backdoor and that is then compromised you leave yourself wide open to law suits.
I'm not even sure why this is even being debated, it should be a straight no but then again when have politicians ever listened to common sense.
From everyone.
Forever.
If you have evidence of possible illegal activity by someone in your jurisdiction then a court will grant surveillance. That's due process.
But there saying "We have no evidence, but we think they might and this is the only way we will get the evidence." Really? The only way we can prove there is a crime?
And what is Feinstein's colossal hard on for giving the spooks yet more spying powers? Does she not realize what a guaranteed back door in US made products, or designed products, will do to the Californian economy?
"But there saying "We have no evidence, but we think they might and this is the only way we will get the evidence." Really? The only way we can prove there is a crime?"
Say it's a lone wolf who manages to keep a Janus concerning his activities: keeping them hidden away from sight and his activities under the radar. Say he's a farmer so can explain the fertilizer and the diesel. IOW, the ONLY clue you've got is a hint of a hunch and no way to back it up enough to get, say, a warrant. The ONLY way you'll get the evidence is if he commits a crime, but if it's something like a suicide truck bomb, three words apply here: Too Damn Late.
Ah the SEL scenario
For "Swivel Eyed Loon."*
Look at the bombs that have gone off over the last 10 years.
Ever noticed how often the phrase "known to the authorities" comes up after the event?
It's SEL not for the perpetrator, but for the people who propose it, usually posted AC.
There are always reasons and always a trail. It's time people stopped listening to this sort of hysterical BS and remembered the words of Mary Shafer. "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world."
"There are always reasons and always a trail. It's time people stopped listening to this sort of hysterical BS and remembered the words of Mary Shafer. "Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to live in the real world.""
But if no one knows the trail exists, how can they follow it? Take "Unabomber" Ted Kaczynski. No one even heard of him until a relative clued the feds in based on his egomaniacal crypto puzzle. What about Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Were they on any serious terrorist investigation map before Oklahoma City? And then there's the Bath School Massacre: still the worst school massacre in US history. Spontaneous action by a farmer (thus legal access to TNT as excavation charges), and no one could've anticipated his actions because he acted too suddenly: almost immediately after losing a local election.
" the ONLY clue you've got is a hint of a hunch and no way to back it up enough to get, say, a warrant. The ONLY way you'll get the evidence is if he commits a crime, but if it's something like a suicide truck bomb, three words apply here: Too Damn Late."
So, guilty until proven innocent then.
I don't think that I'd like to live in that world.
Would you rather live in a world where not just death but mayhem can come from anywhere at anytime without warning?
Because the human condition basically means we'll end up at one of two extremes. Either the Police State or Anarchy. Any attempt to try for a third option will eventually gravitate towards one or the other end.
And before you quote Benjamin Franklin, allow me to counter with this idea. Perhaps, to spin on a Jack Nicholson line, humanity "can't handle freedom"...
"Would you rather live in a world where not just death but mayhem can come from anywhere at anytime without warning?"
Perhaps you'd better read the news. We're living in that world already, and have been since before we climbed down from the trees.
"Because the human condition basically means we'll end up at one of two extremes. Either the Police State or Anarchy. Any attempt to try for a third option will eventually gravitate towards one or the other end."
And will swing back and forth again and again. That's life.
"And before you quote Benjamin Franklin, allow me to counter with this idea. Perhaps, to spin on a Jack Nicholson line, humanity "can't handle freedom"..."
I think that you will find that 'people' can handle freedom very well thank you very much. It's governments that cannot handle the people being 'free.'
I have yet to figure out whether:
1) She's a "Blue Groupie"
2) She is being well paid.
3) Somebody in the LE community has enough dirt on her (or her husband's) income stream (Hint: Look into his businesses, and the "Student Loan" scandal of which Trump University is just a tiny hint) to make her toe the line.
I suspect all three, to various degrees. But being rich, politically connected, and possibly owed favors by uniform-wearing thugs is a good way to stay in office. Also, having the GOP only field outright loons against her in the primaries doesn't hurt.
As explained so many times, if you have a budget (i.e. $100k) you can get around any of those mobile phone "security" measures.
Here is a public talk about the capabilities of the Dutch agencies from 2013. You will notice that this includes a FIB with which you can easily rewire any kind of security chip internally to keep it from storing a "usage" counter. Or alternatively to read out the encrypted key and the algorithm, and just do a bruteforce attack. (which is trivial if you have a numeric password)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVGlr5fleQA
Here's a talk giving an overview on how that can be done:
https://media.ccc.de/v/30C3_-_5417_-_en_-_saal_6_-_201312281245_-_extracting_keys_from_fpgas_otp_tokens_and_door_locks_-_david
Some of the most secure crypto devices on a budget are Pay-TV cards, and if you watch the Panorama documentary, you will find that different companies have been able to circumvent those measures several times in the past. The documentary is called "Murdoch's TV Pirates"
Logically to encrypt data stored on a device you need a secret. That secret has to be entered at least every time you boot, so it either has to be stored on the device, or derived from some stored information and some passcode. On a device without a keyboard, such a passcode cannot be particularly long and usually only numeric.
So if the industry actually wanted to provide a slightly more secure device, they'd offer it in 2 parts. One is the mobile part, which you carry around with you, but is essentially a terminal, the other one would be a device you can have at a physically safe space where you store all the data on and execute the actual code. Authentication would work via public keys (think of ssh) and the server would automatically remove the authorized key for the device if something is fishy, or after some time.
That way, if your mobile device gets stolen, you can simply remove that key, and the new user won't be able to get any of that data, no matter what they do.
I personally think that the "but we need to catch criminals" thing is rather stupid. Police did catch criminals before they were carrying around lists of contacts with them. In fact, people used to remember phone numbers and addresses inside of their head.
"So if the industry actually wanted to provide a slightly more secure device, they'd offer it in 2 parts. One is the mobile part, which you carry around with you, but is essentially a terminal, the other one would be a device you can have at a physically safe space where you store all the data on and execute the actual code. Authentication would work via public keys (think of ssh) and the server would automatically remove the authorized key for the device if something is fishy, or after some time."
So what about people for whom phones are a pariah and don't keep any? In other words, how do you do two-factor authorization when the person refuses to keep a second factor. Plus, what if the thief is able to log in and establish a beachhead BEFORE you can nullify the credential (say he mugs you and knocks you out so you can't call the cops and so on before it's too late)?
"I personally think that the "but we need to catch criminals" thing is rather stupid. Police did catch criminals before they were carrying around lists of contacts with them. In fact, people used to remember phone numbers and addresses inside of their head."
They would counter "not enough of them," as the past was a pretty chaotic time. Just look at the Wild West and the times of the rolling bandits like Bonnie and Clyde.
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