Senator Wyden is quite right: a back door is (eventually) a back door for those who pose more actual, as against imaginary, risk for those who use (or should) cryptographic systems in the course of life or business. That said, major data exposures rarely result from cryptographic vulnerabilities or failures; there are plenty of other exploitable vulnerabilities, and one or more of them has been implicated in nearly all of the major incidents. Furthermore, government communication surveillance is not much dependent on cryptographic vulnerabilities, and would not be helped greatly by introducing back doors in cryptographic systems used in the US.
Senator Wyden's opinion piece is built upon straw men. His recently introduced bill does nothing particularly significant: it explicitly excludes CALEA, which appears to be an open door to law enforcement searches of cell phones and computers. This bill would forbid a practice that has no legal basis now, and is unnecessary. No law that I am aware of limits the use of cryptographic systems in the US, or limits the systems that people may use to those approved by the government, with possible exceptions in commerce or banking. Most users, if not all, are free to choose ciphers as they like, including those developed and analyzed outside the control of any Federal agency or, indeed, outside the US (and Five Eyes).
Senator Wyden is correct, but nonetheless is a normal grandstanding politician. He may be one of the most vocal on the subject at hand, but it is unlikely that the Congress in the present would enact a law mandating encryption systems with back doors any more than the Congress of 20 years or so ago would mandate use of the CLIPPER and CAPSTONE chips.