In the same vein.
It's occurred to me it'd be possible to have a virtual internet--one where physical (real) IP addresses were always obfuscated (decoupled) from net users by an encrypted layer.
It seems to me the net can never be totally secure until both users and servers are working in (interfaced to) a virtual world. That's to say servers would never be able to locate the physical location [real IP addres] of a user nor a user locate the physical location of his data server--both would only ever see virtual addresses.
Unless the encryption is broken snoops would never know the physical location of either a user or the server(s) he was using. In such a schema the servers would also be encrypted so if accidentally found there'd be no return address to source the key.
We had the inklings of such a scheme in the old WWII days when radio was the primary means of transmitting encrypted messages. In a radio comms circuit, especially one working over very long distances, an interceptor could only vaguely guess the location of the transmitter (poor direction finding meant he could be hundreds of miles off course). And those who were only ever receiving information could never be detected by the interceptor just sniffing the aether [the equivalent of intercepting IP packets]. Receivers would only be detected if their receiving requirement leaked RF (which sometimes happened but it shouldn't) or if someone discovered the location of those doing the receiving by accident.
It seems to me we should reevaluate the internet from basics if we want to truly keep snoops away. Being snoop-proof must, a priori, be fundamental to the design.