It's not your ball, anymore, r G-Man
It's no wonder governments (and their traditional sidekicks from the packet-inspection industry) are so leery of operations like Google and RIM owning so much of the network. Nations are going, from being providers of the Internet's backbones, to being customers of it.
For instance, while China controls China Telecom, it can buy whatever creepy hardware it wants from the likes of Arbornet, and the US government can just quietly give the deal the nod. After all, selling network monitoring hardware is just business, right? But when the likes of RIM or Google start to extend great chunks of their own networks deep into government territory (and quite patently never buy anything from any of the traditional, state-approved, network monitoring solutions) the spooks begin to panic. The lines of communication are still there, to be controlled, but they are no longer controlled by the governments.
The interesting thing, here, is that RIM has a mutual interest, with the other corporate players, in presenting a unified front against this sort of pressure, because they have a common interest in being able to provide best-in-business levels of security to their customers. Each government, on the other hand, must act in its own interests, when trying to tear down these levels of security, because their motivation for doing so comes, in part, from their desire to spy on other governments. (The UAE may call for the same rights to the data as Saudi Arabia, for instance, but their reason for doing so is that they may want the ability to read messages going in and out of the Saudi Arabian embassy, at some point.)
Time may yet come, where governments are asking for those parts of the corporate networks that THEY make use of, be put into special encrypted tunnels, so that no one else can get at it! By implication, national security then becomes a function of what service plan you can afford.